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A mature oil field rescaled contraction describes a switch to a technological alternative more 
appropriate for the depleted state of an underlying resource. Off-shore oil rigs are an 
illustration, since the original technological scale designed for very large output flows 
becomes inappropriate as their operational efficiency declines later in life and facing a 
dwindling output flow, so a more appropriate extraction technology becomes economic. A 
real option representation is formulated on a stochastic oil price and deteriorating output 
volume. We view these investment/divestment decisions both separately, and jointly, which 
have different implications for government policies and also option values. The resulting 
model yields analytical (or semi-analytical) results indicating that immediate switching to the 
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lower cost technology could sometimes be hastened as the price volatility increases, 
depending on the current revenue, if divestment and switching are considered jointly.  




We investigate the viability of implementing a rescale policy for mature oilfields (and similar 
problems) under declining periodic output volumes and volatile oil prices. This is formulated 
as a real option model, which provides the revenue threshold justifying switching from a 
conventional to a more appropriate technology and compares the economics of this policy 
with abandonment, initially in an analytical form. 
 
While a replacement constitutes a like-for-like exchange of a deteriorated productive asset for 
a brand-new version, a rescaling-contraction is defined here as a switch to a more appropriate 
technology used specifically in extracting a mature exhaustible resource. The erosion in the 
economic prospects for a conventional technology due to continuous deterioration in 
productivity and efficiency, usually associated with cumulative output, is often a prompt for 
appraising its qualities relative to an appropriate technology operating at a lower output but 
with a lower operating cost. Off-shore platforms (installations, rigs) are an interesting 
illustration. Typically, these large-scale extraction facilities, suitable for the largest 
discoveries, carry commensurately large capital and operating costs. The viability of large-
scale installations becomes increasingly questionable during their end-of-life stage due to the 
reduction in the extraction rate and decline in the reserve volume, a business state that 
becomes increasingly acute as oil prices decline. The inevitable outcome is abandonment, 
unless a rescaling-contraction to a small-scale, appropriate technology with lower operating 
costs is economically justified.  
 
Our formulation is an abstracted illustration of the current state of many off-shore United 
Kingdom continental shelf (UKCS) oil facilities, representing a mature off-shore basin with 
operating asset ages exceeding 30 years. From its peak in 1999, production has steadily 
declined until 2014 at an annual rate of about 7%1.  The Wood (2014) report focuses on 
maximizing economic recovery, as 70% of the UKCS decline is considered to be due to 
production inefficiencies, compounded by a lack of investment in new technology. This 
report      recommends increased asset stewardship through technological advancements 
having the potential to increase efficiencies and enhance recovery rates and volumes, while 
                                               
1In contrast, 2015-2916 experienced a recovery due to new field openings. Production data on each field are 
available from http://data-ogauthority.opendata.arcgis.com/pages/production.  A primary stated objective of the 




maximizing the economic extension of the field life. Those fields most susceptible to 
abandonment are classified as marginal, characterized as having low remaining recoverable 
reserves, low volume production, and unfavourable economics. 
 
Various authors focus on different critical factors in off-shore oil field abandonment 
decisions. Kemp (1992) considers the current operating and abandonment costs, the adequacy 
of the selected timing criterion, the role of fiscal relief and security concerns, along with 
fluctuating oil prices, field interdependency and technological progress. A net present value 
analysis shows a greater incentive to postpone abandonment in the presence of a less steep 
production decline rate, higher abandonment costs and a higher discount rate. The 
externalities associated with decommissioning off-shore installations for all maritime users, 
including environmental groups and governments as well as the oil companies, are 
considered by Osmundsen and Tveterås (2003). Disposal costs can vary by field even for the 
same geographic region, while differences in disposal strategies can lead to varying 
reputational and cost consequences apportioned amongst the players. Parente et al. (2006) 
extend this scope by considering the role of a periodic ex-ante tax deductibility of the 
decommissioning cost despite constituting an ex-post expense and the question of assigning 
decommissioning responsibility for an installation following a transfer of rights during the 
project life.  
 
One of the earliest real option analysis of entry and exit thresholds in natural resources is 
Tourinho (1979), who advocates the inclusion of a holding cost to ensure exercise, see also 
Adkins and Paxson (2013). Paddock et al. (1988) show that oil field lease values increase 
with greater volatility. The models of Bjerksund and Ekern (1990) for oil development value 
include the analytical American perpetuity real call option. Laughton (1998) shows that both 
oil price and reserve volume uncertainties enhance the prospect value but distinctively 
influence the exercise of the various decisions. McCormack and Sick (2001) discuss the use 
of real options in valuing undeveloped reserves. Dias (2004) advocates that a real options 
format is appropriate for evaluating oil extraction decisions due to the inherent revenue 
uncertainty and managerial flexibility.  Chorn and Shokhor (2006) apply a jump diffusion 
model for evaluating the emergence of new information in petroleum developments. 
Muehlenbachs (2009) considers innovations in costs of reactivation of idle oil wells. Guedes 
and Santos (2016) assess the value of an offshore oil development installation involving a 
sequence of interdependent decisions modelled as options and show a high value associated 
5 
 
with abandonment. The role of 2CO  in enhancing oil recovery rates as well as mitigating its 
potentially harmful effects on the environment is assessed by Compernolle et al. (2017), who 
consider two stochastic factors. 
   
A technology rescale with its more favourable properties can be conceived as a discrete 
sequential investment style model for an active productive asset that can assume more than 
one state. The earliest formulations of this type are the continual switching models between 
an active and suspended state as presented by Brennan and Schwartz (1985) and Dixit (1989). 
Trigeorgis (1996) provides a basic model of the option to contract, where the investor has the 
opportunity to choose once in one year’s time whether to make the full remaining investment 
expenditure to obtain the full project value, or alternatively a reduced expenditure (equal to 
the cost savings) for a proportion of the project value.  This is equivalent to a European put 
option, so there is no flexibility of investment timing, or a project value that would justify 
immediate investment (option value is shown as a function of project value).  Although the 
basic approach is shown as a binomial discrete time model, alternative computational 
methods are suggested for an American put, which could reflect sensitivity to changes in 
expected interest rates, drifts and future volatility.  In an extension to multiple states, Paxson 
(2005) develops a contraction-expansion model having contraction as one of its states, 
characterized by a more favourable operating cost structure (for lower quality and lower 
scale) in the presence of a profit decline. These early models typically are based on a single 
stochastic factor and ignore technological innovations. Insley (2017) examines the effect of 
carbon tax schemes on the optimal timing of construction, production and abandonment of oil 
sands extraction.  
 
In contrast, Malchow-Møller and Thorsen (2005) propose a repeated investment model of 
potentially ever-improving technological advances, which is installed whenever a sufficient 
productivity deterioration is suffered. Siddiqui and Maribu (2009) formulate a one-factor 
investment model for the electricity generation industry to examine the economic justification 
for a distribution upgrade and show the significance of volatility on the policy decision. 
Siddiqui and Fleten (2010) develop a process representation to model a real option 
formulation of a switch to an alternative energy technology having a more favourable cost 
structure. Kort et al. (2010) show that despite the intrinsic flexibility of a stepwise versus a 
lumpy investment strategy, greater uncertainty makes the latter more attractive. However, the 
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former is always superior if a choice exists on the installed capacity level, Chronopoulos et 
al. (2016).  Chronopoulos and Siddiqui (2015) assess the merits of alternative strategies 
through an optimal timing model for innovative technology replacement in the presence of 
price and technological arrival uncertainty. In an extension, Chronopoulos and Lumbreras 
(2017) assess the effect of risk aversion on the reluctance to switch between regimes under 
market and technological uncertainty to show that changes in volatility, risk aversion and 
innovation significantly affect the optimal policy decision.   
 
Mutually exclusive investments are examined by Dixit (1993), while Décamps et al. (2006) 
point out that the Dixit solution is not necessarily correct in all contexts, as discussed below. 
Other authors consider several factors, sometimes two stochastic factors. Bobtcheff and 
Villeneuve (2010) extend the Décamps et al. (2006) approach to stochastic input and output 
prices. Adkins and Paxson (2011a), Dockendorf and Paxson (2013) and Støre et al. (2018) 
examine two-stochastic-factor models on making a viable irreversible switch between two 
different inputs (outputs) to show that both sources of uncertainty are crucial in the optimal 
decision.   
 
Several authors have addressed Décamps type problems.  Fleten et al. (2007) is an early 
application of the Décamps method to a choice between mutually exclusive projects of 
different scale, simplified as the solution to four equations with four unknowns.  Fleten et al. 
(2011) considers basic mutually exclusive investments of lower and higher scale, and also a 
lower scale with a switching option to upgrade to the higher scale. Hagspiel et al. (2016) 
examine a generation investment problem, deciding when to replace a declining product. 
Lavrutich (2017) mentions that the Décamps problem is similar to hers insofar as “the 
optimal investment intervals of two projects do not intersect, creating the inaction region”.  
Lukas et al. (2017) note a hysteresis while considering choice among three mutually 
exhaustive investments, providing a numerical solution. Dumortier et al. (2017) cite 
Décamps, and provide a numerical solution for mean reversion and two-way switching.  
Guerra et al. (2018) mention Décamps in the conclusion, as a possible extension, to their 
simultaneous solution of ten equations.    Truong et al. (2018) examine a problem close to 
ours, studying several alternative climate change abatement technologies, when there is 
uncertainty, but with a quite different application.  Optimal investment for a single project is 




Our aim is to develop and analyse a discrete sequential investment problem characterizing the 
rescale trade-off between continuing to use the conventional incumbent technology for oil 
extraction versus installing an appropriate technology with lower operating costs, under price 
uncertainty and a declining periodic output volume.   Our real option formulation employs a 
perpetuity to value the residual reserve volume. However, a divestment option is introduced 
to ensure a finite time termination as advocated by Preinreich (1940) for analytical appraisal 
models based on an infinite lifetime assumption. The divestment option incurs a significant 
decommissioning cost on exercise and provides the means for terminating the implied 
infinitely lived asset.   
 
There are four principal contributions made by this paper. First, we develop a one stochastic 
and one deterministic factor representation in which the output price follows an assumed 
stochastic process and the output volume declines deterministically with cumulative 
production, but despite this complexity it yields initially an analytical solution. Second, we 
are concerned with determining the revenue thresholds that discriminate between justifying a 
conventional technology divestment without rescaling, and appropriate technology rescaling 
but with the conventional technology divested, under separate and then joint formulations. A 
rescaling-contraction is economically justified when the decline in the value of the periodic 
extracted oil output and investment cost is offset by the value of the redued operating costs. 
Thirdly, we provide some insights on rescaling with partial divesting. Finally, numerical  
analysis is used to show the sensitivity of the threshold justifying extending the life of mature 
fields of changing several government policy variables.  
 
Questions that we address are: (1) how does the volatility of oil prices (the stochastic 
element) affect the timing (thresholds) of divestment, and/or adoption of lower cost 
technology?  (2) What is the difference between divestment and/or switching timing with and 
without a new lower cost technology, under the Dixit and adapted Décamps methods? (3) 
Would government subsidies or tax credits on divestment and/or lower cost technology 
investments changing parameter values affect the timing of disinvestment and/or rescaling? 
(4) What other feasible government policies could motivate extending the life of mature 
fields? 
 
Generally, we find that by treating the divestment and switching investment decisions as a 
separate formulation, both the exercise thresholds and option coefficients decrease as 
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volatility increases, but at different rates.  A different pattern emerges when the divestment 
and investment switching decisions are treated in a joint formulation.  As the volatility 
increases, the divestment threshold decreases but the switching threshold increases, so the 
inaction region widens.  
Several simplifying assumptions are introduced to make the real-option switching model 
analytically tractable. Switching once only between the two technologies, or between the 
incumbent technology and divestment, is treated as irreversible and instantaneous. Switching 
and any periodic operating costs are assumed to be known and constant. Although holding 
costs, royalties, tax, tax depreciation allowances and government subsidies (which could alter 
the effective investment, operating and decommissioning costs) are not directly considered in 
the analysis, it is straightforward to include them with an additional level of complexity, 
Adkins and Paxson (2017). 
 
The paper is organized as follows. The real option model derivations are developed in section 
2. Section 3 explores numerical sensitivity analysis to gain further insights into the model 
solution. The paper ends with conclusions mostly about plausible government policies for 
extending the life of mature fields, and model limitations and extensions. 
2 Optimal Selection 
We seek to optimize the value an owner can capture from a mature nearly-depleted oil 
reserve. Up until now, a single large-scale technology solution has been deployed to extract 
the oil from the reserve. But, the owner is facing the challenge of closing down production 
because the net revenue flow is becoming uneconomic. The available alternatives are 
between policy (a) of divesting the associated assets and terminating oil extraction, and 
policy (b) of divesting the associated assets but switching to a small-scale extraction 
technology, which is designed to be more appropriate for the current underlying conditions of 
low oil prices, low output flows, or both. We suppose there are just two oil extraction 
technologies, labelled the large-scale incumbent X  normally applied at inception and the 
small-scale appropriate2 Y . Typically, very large oil discoveries are served just by X , and its 
                                               
2 The binary representation of technology as being conventional and appropriate is an abstraction, since in 
reality, offshore oil platforms vary in size with fixed platforms and compliant towers being the largest and and 
floating production storage offloading facilities, possibly unattended and remotely controlled, being the 
smallest. The economics are commensurate with their size. Specialist firms, such as Atkins Oil and Gas, 
Aquaterra Energy, Genesis Oil and Gas Consultants, and MFDevCo, offer switching advice on effective 
facilities conducive to mature field economics. There are several companies specializing in appropriate 
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scale is reflected in the magnitude of the various costs incurred. Commissioning a rig based 
on X  requires not only substantial capital expenditures but also significant periodic 
operating expenses, which have to be offset by both high output flows and high oil prices. As 
the residual oil reserve declines with extraction, eventually the gross revenue will not cover 
the operating expense. If technology X  becomes uneconomic, the owner has to choose 
between policy (a) and (b). The small-scale appropriate technology Y  is specially designed 
for low volume production for mature fields because of its lower operating expense. The 
economic replacement of X  by Y  demands that the resulting gain in reduced operating 
expense is sufficient to compensate any revenue fall as well as the switching investment cost. 
Our intent is to identify the optimal conditions favouring the adoption of either policy (a) or 
(b) in the context of a stochastic oil price and a deterministically declining extraction flow. 
 
The problem of selecting between two or more alternative opportunities with different 
payoffs under uncertainty is similar to that studied by Dixit (1993) and Décamps et al. 
(2006), except for the output decline shifts. According to Dixit (1993), for a sufficiently high 
initial revenue generated by X , the optimal choice is switching to the alternative having the 
higher option value, either (a) or (b), as soon as its respective threshold is attained. However, 
if the threshold exceeds initial revenue, then the alternative having the higher net present 
value is selected with immediate effect. Décamps et al. (2006) contest the validity of the 
second part of this rule. They demonstrate that at the point of indifference where the net 
present values for the two alternatives are equal, it is not optimal to invest in either, since 
there exists an inaction region where the best policy is to wait until additional information 
clearly discriminates in favour of one of the alternatives. The optimal policy prescriptions for 
Dixit (1993) and Décamps et al. (2006) are illustrated in Figure 1. This is adapted for a 
declining revenue stream, assuming that there are two policy alternatives (a) and (b), and 
policy (b) commands a greater switch option value. If the initial revenue under X  denoted by 
Xv  exceeds the policy (b) switch threshold ˆSXv , then the optimal policy for either 
prescription is to wait for additional information until the revenue declines sufficiently to 
ˆX SXv v= , when (b) is exercised. For an initial revenue ˆX SXv v< , the Dixit (1993) prescription 
is to invest in whichever policy alternative possesses the greater net present value. In contrast, 
the Décamps et al. (2006) prescription is to invest in policy (b) if the initial revenue exceeds 
                                                                                                                                                  
investments for mature fields such as EnQuest PLC.  “Enhanced oil recovery” methods for mature fields may 




or equals the jointly obtained upper threshold denoted by ˆSSXv  so requiring ˆX SSXv v≥ , but in 
policy (a) if Xv  lies at or below the jointly obtained lower threshold denoted by ˆDDXv  so 
ˆX DDXv v≤ . The lower and upper thresholds ( )ˆ ˆ,DDX SSXv v  specify an inaction region where the 
best policy is to wait for additional information that distinctly justifies exercising one of the 
two policies (see Appendix A and B). 
Figure 1: Policy Prescriptions 
 
This figure represents the optimal policy prescriptions of Dixit (1993) and Décamps et al. (2006) for an installation facing 
uncertain but inevitably declining revenues, denoted by v . It is assumed that policy (b) has the greater option value. We use 
the notation defined in Table 1. The separately obtained thresholds for policy (b) and policy (a) are ˆSXv  and ˆDXv , 
respectively.  For an initial revenue ˆSXv v< , the inaction region defined by Décamps et al. (2006) is specified by the upper 
and lower thresholds, ˆSSXv  and ˆDDXv , respectively. The stopping region for policy (b) is given by ( )ˆ ˆ,SSX SXv v  and for (a) 
by ( )ˆ0, DDXv . The indifference point defined for equal net present values is denoted by SDv . Adapting Décamps et al. 
(2006), we expect ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆSX SXX DX DDXν ν ν ν> > > . 
 
2.1 The Stochastic Model 
The model is formulated on the generic stochastic variable v , which denotes the periodic 
revenue rendered by the oil installation. Where necessary, we append the subscript X  or Y  
to indicate the underlying technology. Revenue is defined as the product of a stochastic oil 
price p  and a deterministically declining periodic output flow q , so v pq= . The oil price is 
described by a geometric Brownian motion process, see Pindyck (1999): 
 d d dpp p t p Wα σ= + , (1) 
where pα  denotes the known drift rate, σ  the price volatility, and dW  an increment of the 
standard Wiener process. The output flow follows the declining balance form: 
 dq dq tq= − , (2) 
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where 0q >  denotes a known constant depletion rate. The residual reserve volume is 
Rq q q= , so for any given Rq  a flow increase (decrease) has to be compensated by a 
commensurate increase (decrease) in the depletion rate. Using Ito’s Lemma, Brennan and 
Schwartz (1985), the evolution of the value of an active incumbent firm with options to make 
(further) investments or divest, in a risk-neutral context, with periodic operating expense f , 





F F Fp r p q pq f rF
p p q
σ δ q∂ ∂ ∂+ − − + − − =
∂ ∂ ∂
, (3) 
where F  denotes the option value, 0prδ α= − >  the oil convenience yield and r  is the risk-
free rate. Based on the American perpetuity solution,  the valuation function V  satisfying (3), 
Adkins and Paxson (2011b), takes the form: 
 1 1 2 21 2
p q f p q fV F A p q A p q
r r
β γ β γ
δ q δ q
= + − = + + −
+ +
, (4) 
where 1 2,A A  are two non-negative coefficients, and the generic parameters β  and γ  are 
related through the characteristic equation: 
 ( ) ( ) ( )212, 1 0Q r rβ γ σ β β δ β qγ= − + − − − = . (5) 
The principle of similarity can be shown to apply to all model versions. This is because the 
elasticities of the net gain due to a switch arising from an oil price change or from an 
identical oil volume change are equal, irrespective of whether the switch is to policy (a) or 
(b).  This can be verified by examining the respective smooth-pasting conditions. It implies 




1 2 2 22 2 2
2, r r rδ q δ qβ β
σ σ σ
− − − −   = − ± − +   
   
, (6) 
where 1 1β >  and 2 0β < . Both 1 2,β β  vary with the depletion rate q , so for , ,i i X Yq =  the 
power parameters are expressed as 1 2,i iβ β . If X Yq q> , then 1 1 2 2,X Y X Yβ β β β> > . Further, 
because of similarity, the analysis can be framed in terms of a single variable v  instead of the 
two variables, p  and q , so (4) becomes: 
 1 21 2




= + + −
+
. (7) 
The potential choices facing an owner actively deploying technology X  to extract oil from a 
mature reservoir are illustrated in Figure 2. This shows that regardless of the technology 
deployed, the active process of oil extraction is eventually brought to an end and terminated 
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when the installation is optimally divested. This effectively limits the infinite lifetime implied 
by the American perpetuity solution to a finite if uncertain duration. The consequence of 
declining oil revenues is to motivate the owner to evaluate the comparative merits of the 
policy (a) of divesting the installation based on X , and (b) of switching to Y  after divesting 
X . Both opportunities are treated as if the commissioning can be effected instantaneously. 
For (b), it is initially assumed that technology X  is entirely divested, but this requirement is 
subsequently relaxed. The possibility of temporary suspension as analysed by Mossin (1968), 
Brennan and Schwartz (1985) and Dixit (1988) is excluded because of the substantial costs in 
maintaining the oil installation assets inactive but ready for reactivation, which may be 
feasible for on shore idle wells, see Muehlenbachs (2009). Although policies (a) and (b) are 
inter-dependent and thereby require a joint analysis, we commence by evaluating each policy 





p   Oil price 
q   Periodic output flow 
v pq=   Periodic output value (revenue) 
f   Periodic operating cost 
D   Divestment value (decommissioning cost) 
YK   Switch investment cost 
  
ˆDXv   Optimal divestment threshold for technology X 
  
ˆDYv   Optimal divestment threshold for technology Y 
  
ˆSXv   Optimal switch threshold for technology Y 
ˆDDXv  Jointly obtained X  divestment threshold 
ˆSSXv  Jointly obtained switch threshold 
2DXA   Option coefficient for divesting technology X  
2DYA   Option coefficient for divesting technology Y 
2 XA   Jointly obtained switch option coefficient to switch  





In our notation, lower-case variables represent continuous quantities, such as the periodic output flow and operating cost, 
while upper-case variables are one-off quantities, such as the switch cost and divestment value. Optimal thresholds are 
denoted by  . All quantities are expressed in terms of the technology specified in the subscript. Option coefficients have the 
subscript 1 or 2 , denoting investment-style or divestment-style (switch) opportunities, respectively. 
 
 
Figure 2: Potential Choices 
 
 
2.2 Separate Formulation 
We first evaluate the divestment opportunity that is available to an owner actively extracting 
oil using technology X  assuming that policy (b) is not available. In (7),  the divestment 
option value is redefined as 22 ˆ XDX DXA v
β  where 2 2 0DXA A= ≥  denotes the option coefficient and 
DXv v=  the revenue for the active installation while 1 0A = ,   since the option value increases 
with declining revenues. Divesting entails foregoing the net revenue value 
( )ˆDX X Xv f rδ q+ −  and the divestment option, but receiving (paying) the divestment value 
XD  in compensation. The value-matching relationship expressed in terms of the revenue 
threshold ˆDXv  is given by: 
 22
ˆ ˆ XDX X DX DX X
X






.  (8) 
(8) combined with its associated smooth-pasting condition 
 2 12 2










































β δ q β
−−
− +
= = − + − + − 
. (10) 
When policy (a) is treated separately, the optimal decision is to divest whenever ˆDXv v≤  
since divestment is motivated by low revenues. The option value for divesting X  is 
characterized by 2 0DXA ≥ , which is an increasing function of , , ,X X XD f q δ . A negative 
abandonment value, or a positive decommissioning charge, is permissible only if 
X Xf r D> − , and the option to divest loses its attractiveness as the decommissioning charge 
increases since 2 0Xβ < . There is an expression similar to (10) for the option coefficient when 
divesting Y , with the subscript X  being replaced by Y .  
 
Policy (b), the alternative to (a), involves committing a capital expenditure YK   to rescale to 
Y  with its lower depletion rate Yq  after divesting X . Assuming (a) is unavailable, then 
switching to policy (b) entails foregoing the net revenue value under X , ( )X X Xv f rδ q+ − , 
and incurring a net capital expenditure, Y XK D− . The resulting net revenue value rendered 
by Y  is ( )Y Y Yv f rδ q+ − , where Yv  and Yf  denote the revenue and operating expense 
under Y . Since the residual oil reserve volume is equal under either technology, their 
respective output flows, ,X Yq q  are related through X X Y Yq qq q= . Assuming an 
instantaneous switch with the same oil price, X X Y Yv vq q= . We expect that at the smaller 
scale, Y  has a lower output flow so Y Xq q<  and Y Xq q< .  Since the gain in net revenue 
value rendered by the switch has to more than compensate the net switching cost Y XK D− , 









δ q q δ q
 −
+ −  + + 
 






Y Y X Y X Y
δ q qq
δ q q δ q q δ q δ q
−
− = − <
+ + + +
. (11) 
An irreversible switch from X  to Y  is only economically justified provided that any ensuing 
gross revenue loss plus the switching capital expenditure are more than compensated by gains 




Similar to (a), switching to policy (b) and adopting Y  is motivated by low revenues. We 
denote the optimal policy (b) switching threshold by ˆSXv  such that continued extraction under 
X  is maintained while ˆX SXv v> , but Y  replaces X  whenever ˆX SXv v≤ . This implies that the 
switch option function for (b) takes the identical form as that for the divest option with (a). 
Although measured in terms of revenue under X , the rule is also expressible in terms of 
revenue under Y , ˆSYv , through the relationship ˆ ˆSY Y SX Xv vq q= , but the former is preferred to 
make policies (a) and (b) directly comparable. An economically justified switch requires that 
the rendered incremental net gains at least compensate the incremental net opportunity costs, 
where both gains and costs are interpreted to include any embedded options. Specifically, 
gains due to the operating expense change and the embedded Y  divestment option have to at 
least exceed losses arising from the revenue fall, the net switching cost as well as the 
foregone switching option value. The value matching relationship is: 
 








SX SX YX Y Y
SX SX Y X DY SX
X X Y X






δ q q δ q q
− + = − − − +
+ +
,  (12) 
where 2 2,SX DYA A  denote the option coefficient for a switch and Y  divestment, respectively. 
2DYA  is obtained in the same way as for X , (10): 

















= − + − 
.  (13) 










SX SX Y Y
X SX SX Y DY SX
X X Y X




























X X Y Y X Y
X Y DY SX
X X X
v
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− − = − + − + − − 
  (15) 
There is apparently no closed-form solution for ˆSXv , (15) if 2 0.DYA >  However, some 
insights into the properties of ˆSXv  are obtainable by assuming the Y  divestment optionality is 
absent. We set 0ˆ ˆSX SXv v=  to distinguish this case. Since ( )2 20 1 1X Xβ β< − < , a viable switch 
16 
 
requires the revenue value change to be less than the change in overall costs when 2 0DYA =
3. 
Also, 0ˆSXv  is feasible only if the gain from foregoing Xf  exceeds the return on net capital 
expenditure ( )Y Xr K D−  and Yf . Since 0ˆSXv  is linearly dependent on , , ,Y Y X XK f D f , a less 
unfavourable Y  cost structure (increases in ,Y YK f ) but a more favourable X  cost structure 
(decreases in ,X Xf D ) each produces a decrease in 0ˆSXv  thereby forcing the switch decision 
to be deferred, so if 0XD < , a decommissioning charge increase produces a deferral. 
 
The consequence of Y  divestment optionality being present rather than absent, 2 0DYA > , is 
to defer the optimal switch decision and to raise the switch option value. In (15), since 
2 2, 0X Yβ β <  and 2 2X Yβ β> , the inclusion of Y  divestment optionality has the effect of 
reducing the right-hand side value, which causes the threshold solution to fall relative to that 
in its absence. The magnitude of this effect is reduced for increases in either the threshold 
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If Y  divestment optionality is absent, 2 0DYA = , then 2 2 0 0SX SXA A= >  since 2 0Xβ < . In its 
presence, the effect is to uplift the switch option coefficient since 2 2, 0X Yβ β <  and to make 
the switch option more attractive, but its attractiveness recedes as its decommissioning charge 
increases. 
 
Provided the initial revenue exceeds the thresholds, the choice between policy (a) and (b) is 
decided by the magnitudes of their option values. This is equivalent to selecting the policy 
having the greater option coefficient since there is only a single source of uncertainty. No 
analytical result exists for the ratio of the option coefficients unless we assume the Y  
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= −   + +  
. (17) 
                                               
3 This is a simplifying case eliminating the second part of the RHS of (15), but it requires an imagination that 
there could be no option to divest ever after the switch.  
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For policy (b) to be preferred, 2 0 2SX DXA A> , both 0X Yq q− >  and ( ) ( )Y Y X XK f r D f r+ +  
need to be as small as possible. This suggests that a smaller scale technology is optimal and 
selected to replace the incumbent provided its depletion rate is close to that for X  and the 
overall expenditures for operating Y  are low. If a switch is judged to be optimal in the 
absence of Y  divestment optionality, then it is also optimal in its presence due to (16). 
 
2.3 Joint Formulation 
Décamps et al. (2006) demonstrate that the joint evaluation of mutually-exclusive policies 
results in an inaction region. To start, we presume the separately evaluated preferred policy to 
be (b) so 2 2SX DXA A>  and ˆ ˆSX DXv v> . If ˆX SXv v< , the owner is favoured with two options. 
The first relates to policy (a), which is represented by a decreasing function of revenue 
because lower revenues motivate its exercise, while the second relates to policy (b), which is 
represented an increasing function of revenue because higher revenues motivates its exercise. 
A significant downward movement in revenue may be sufficient to trigger policy (a) because 
the consequential first option increase over-compensates the second option decrease. 
Similarly, policy (b) may be triggered by a significant upward movement in revenue because 
the consequential second option increase over-compensates the first option decrease. This 
results in the inaction region, which can be specified by ( ) ( )ˆ ˆ ˆ, 0,DDX SSX SXv v v⊂ , where 
ˆ ˆDDX SSXv v<  denote lower and upper thresholds, respectively. If ˆX DDXv v≤  then the optimal 
policy is (a), if ˆX SSXv v≥  then the optimal policy is (b), while if  ( )ˆ ˆ,X DDX SSXv v v∈  then the 
optimal policy is to maintain continued extraction under X . 
 
We now extend the Décamps et al. (2006) correction to the divestment-switch model. The 
lower and upper thresholds are obtained from two respective value-matching relationships, 
the first representing the optimal conditions prevailing when policy (a) is exercised, and the 
second when (b) is exercised. The relationships are drawn from (8) and (12), respectively: 
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  (18) 
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The option values, 1 21 2,X XX X X XA v A v
β β  for ˆX SXv v< , representing respectively the opportunity 
values of policy (a) and (b), are decreasing and increasing functions of Xv . Despite both 
policies involving divestment, the opportunity value for policy (b) is an increasing function 
since for ( )ˆ ˆ,X DDX SSXv v v∈  a positive Xv  change signals its likely exercise. The option 
coefficients, 1 2,X XA A  are treated as non-negative because the options are value-creating. In 
line with Décamps et al. (2006), we expect ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆDDX DX SSX SXv v v v< < < .  From (18) the values for 
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From (19) and (20), solution values for the two thresholds satisfy: 
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− − − = 

− − + − = 
. (21) 
Solutions are usually obtainable through the use of numerical methods. 
 
There are at least two qualifications in using the Décamps et al. (2006) amendment for 
identifying a possible inaction region. Assuming a world of active maturing oil fields 
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characterized by declining revenues due to reduced output flows and knowledge of a fully 
available appropriate technology, the appropriate technology would always be implemented 
for an initial revenue ˆX SXv v>  as soon as the prevailing revenue declines sufficiently to hit 
the threshold ˆSXv , provided 2 2SX DXA A> . However, if the appropriate technology is launched  
after ˆX SXv v< , then the amended formulation (18) becomes obligatory. This does presume  
that the derived inaction region and solution values are feasible and plausible. To be feasible, 
ˆ ˆSSX SXv v< , or otherwise the inaction region includes the stopping time for the optimal 
exercise of the appropriate technology, and to be plausible, 1 2, 0X XA A ≥ , or otherwise the 
associated option is not value enhancing.  
 
2.4 Partly Deferred Divestment 
The rescaling switch from technology X  to Y  may not entail a full divestment, since some 
of the existing installation and infrastructure may be crucial to the successful implementation 
of Y . We denote by ϕ  the proportion of technology X  value divested at the switch, so XDϕ
is the value recovered from divesting the inessential element of X . The remainder ( )1 XDϕ−  
is deferred and recovered (or paid) when Y  is divested, yielding a total ( )1 X YD Dϕ− + . 
Although we constrain 0 1ϕ≤ ≤  in our numerical evaluations, 0ϕ <  is possible for 0XDϕ <  
with 0XD >  or 0XDϕ >  with 0XD < . The optimal switching threshold ( )ˆSXv ϕ is obtained 
from the revised value matching relationship (12): 
 ( ) ( ) ( )
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.  (22) 
The threshold ( )ˆSXv ϕ  and option coefficient ( )2SXA ϕ  are determined in a similar way as before. 
Since the Y  divestment value is now ( )1 X YD Dϕ− + , revising (13) yields: 
 ( )





















−− + + 
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. (23) 
 
In a similar way, we can modify (18) to determine the lower and upper thresholds for the 
inaction region, ( ) ( )ˆ ˆ,DDX SSXv vϕ ϕ , and the respective option coefficients, ( ) ( )1 2,X XA Aϕ ϕ , for the 
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From (21): 
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where: 
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 Also, from (19): 
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3 Numerical Illustrations 
Further insights into the behaviour of the solution are obtained through numerical sensitivity 
analysis. The simulations are in the main generated from the base case, presented in Table 2. 
The conventional technology is seen to be more expensive because of the greater periodic 
operating expense but with a greater depletion rate due to X Yq q> . At divestment, both 
technologies incur decommissioning costs (or negative divestment values). The values in 




Base Case Values 
 
Parameter Symbol Value 
Risk-free rate r   5.0% 
Oil convenience yield δ   3.0% 
Oil price volatility σ   30.0% 
Depletion rate for X   
Xq   5.0% 
Periodic operating cost for X  
Xf   1600 
Divestment value for X   
XD   -2500 
Depletion rate for Y   
Yq   3.0% 
Switch investment cost to Y   
YK  6000 
Periodic operating cost for Y   
Yf   300 
Divestment value for Y   
YD   -120 
3.1 Base Case Solution 
The relevant option power parameters for the two technologies are evaluated from (6) as 
2 0.5104Xβ = −  and 2 0.6073Yβ = − , with 2 2X Yβ β>  as expected. We first consider the 
solution values for the separate formulation, presented in Table 3. This reveals the preferred 
policy to be (b) by having the greater option coefficient. Selecting policy (b) maximises the 
total oil recovery and extends the life of the field, since for an identical oil price, the residual 
volume for the depleted field is less under Y  than for under X  because 
ˆ ˆ222.173DY X Y DXv vq q = < . The effect of excluding Y  divestment optionality is to increase 
the switch threshold but decrease the option coefficient, thereby making policy (b) less 
valuable but exercised earlier. 
 
 
Table 3: Solution for the Separate Formulation using Base Case Values 
ˆDXv   797.475 2DXA   591159.4 
0ˆSXv   2365.393 2 0SXA   610819.9 
ˆDYv   133.304 2DYA   71405.1 
ˆSXv   2342.932 2SXA   656696.6 
The divestment thresholds and option coefficients under ,X Y , 2 2ˆ ˆ, , ,DX DX DY DYv A v A  are obtained  using the base case 
values from (9) and (10), respectively. The switch thresholds and option coefficients, in the absence and presence of Y
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divestment optionality, 2 0DYA =  (with threshold subscript 0) and 2 0DYA > , 0 2 0 2ˆ ˆ, , ,SX SX SX SXv A v A  are obtained  
from (15) and (16), respectively. 
 
When the initial revenue is less than the threshold ˆX SXv v< , the formulation is amended by 
evaluating policy (a) and (b) jointly to generate the inaction region. This is presented in Table 
4, for Y  divestment optionality absent or present. In line with Décamps et al. (2006), we find 
that when Y  divestment optionality is present: 
 ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆSX SSX DX DDXv v v v≥ > ≥ , 
and a similar expression for when absent. For ˆX SXv v< , policy (a) and (b) stopping regions 
are ( )ˆ0, DDXv  and ( )ˆ ˆ,SSX SXv v , respectively, and the inaction region is ( )ˆ ˆ,DDX SSXv v . The effect 
of excluding Y  divestment optionality makes policy (b) less attractive and causes policy (b) 
stopping region to shrink quite significantly, but both policy (a) stopping region and the 
inaction region to extend. Further, since all the option coefficients are positive, the results are 
both feasible and plausible. The amended decision rule becomes: 
 
ˆX SXv v>   Maintain continued extraction under X   
ˆ ˆSX X SSXv v v≥ >   Switch to policy (b) 
ˆ ˆSSX X DDXv v v≥ >   Maintain continued extraction under X  
ˆDDX Xv v≥   Switch to policy (a) 
 
Table 4: Solution for the Joint Formulation using Base Case Values 
Y  divestment optionality absent, 2 0DYA =  
0ˆDDXv   791.341 2 0XA   589847.0 
0ˆSSXv   2106.832 1 0XA   2.111E-05 
Y  divestment optionality present, 2 0DYA >  
ˆDDXv   766.780 2 XA   584420.0 
ˆSSXv   1588.065 1XA   1.134E-04 
The thresholds specifying the inaction region, ( )ˆ ˆ,DDX SSXv v , are evaluated from (21) using the base case values and the 
policy (a) and (b) option coefficients, 2 1,X XA A , from (19) or (20). 
 
Obviously, the particular real option evaluation method matters, since the divestment 
threshold is lower from 797 (separate approach) to 767 (joint analysis), the thresholds 
justifying the switch to the lower cost technology are quite different.  Also, the possibility of 
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the option to divest from that lower cost technology reduces the divestment threshold even 
under the joint method.  
3.2 Variations in the Variables 
Variations in , , , ,X Y X Y Yf f D D K have the expected impact on the solution obtained from the 
separate formulation. Assuming ˆX SXv v>  and policy (b) to have the greater option 
coefficient, Table 5 illustrates the impact of individual changes on the relevant thresholds and 
option values whilst maintaining the other base case values. A positive change in Xf  makes 
continued extraction under X  less attractive. but policy (a) and (b) more attractive. This is 
reflected in both policy (a) and (b) having greater thresholds indicating an earlier exercise and 
greater option coefficients. A positive change in Yf  has no impact on policy (a), but makes 
policy (b) less attractive. It results in a reduction in the switch threshold thereby deferring its 
exercise and in the option coefficient, making it less valuable. The impact of a positive 
change in XD  is to make continued extraction under X  less attractive but policy (a) more 
attractive. This is reflected in a greater threshold ˆDXv  and option coefficient 2DXA , but a 
secondary effect on policy (b) behaviour is also evident due to its influence on Y XK D− . A 
positive change in YD  makes policy (b) more attractive because of the termination option, 
but it has no impact on the behaviour of policy (a). Finally, a reduction in YK  enhances 
policy (b), raising the threshold and the option value whilst having no effect on policy (a). 
 
The stopping regions are derived from the joint formulation for ˆX SXv v< . The impact of the 
individual changes is reported in Table 6, which reveals that the Décamps et al. (2006) 
condition continues to hold. A positive increase in Xf  implies a loss of attractiveness in 
continued extraction under X  while there are gains for both policy (a) and (b) that are 
reflected in increased option coefficients. Also, the stopping regions for policy (a) and (b) 
widen while the inaction region narrows. This picture of a wider policy (a) and (b) stopping 
region but a narrower inaction region is repeated to a greater or lesser extent whenever 
changes for the remaining four variables signal an increase in policy (a) and (b) attractiveness 
relative to continuance. The effect of an XD increase, which enhances the attractiveness of 
both policy (a) and (b), is to widen their stopping regions, while a ,Y Yf K  decrease or YD  
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increase, which enhances the attractiveness of only policy (b), is to produce a widening for 





Impact of Variations in the Variables on the Thresholds and Option Coefficients 
 
 
ˆDXv   ˆSXv   2DXA   2SXA   
Base case 797.48 2342.93 5.91159E+05 6.56697E+05 
I 1680Xf =   840.73 2560.38 6.40251E+05 7.42595E+05 
 1520Xf =   754.22 2125.30 5.43409E+05 5.74778E+05 
II 315Yf =   797.48 2300.24 5.91159E+05 6.44857E+05 
 285Yf =   797.48 2385.52 5.91159E+05 6.68806E+05 
III 2625XD = −   794.10 2325.94 5.87380E+05 6.50151E+05 
 2375XD = −   800.85 2359.93 5.94947E+05 6.63267E+05 
IV 126YD = −   797.48 2342.97 5.91159E+05 6.56621E+05 
 114YD = −   797.48 2342.90 5.91159E+05 6.56772E+05 
V 6300YK =   797.48 2302.14 5.91159E+05 6.41028E+05 
 5700YK =   797.48 2383.72 5.91159E+05 6.72505E+05 
 
The threshold and option coefficient for policy (a) 2ˆ ,DX DXv A  are determined from (9) and (10), respectively, and for 
policy (b) 2ˆ ,SX SXv A  from (15) and (16), respectively. The impacts are evaluated for a 5% increase and decrease in the 
base case value for I: operating charge under X , Xf , II operating charge under Y , Yf , III: divestment value for X , 
XD , IV: divestment value for Y , YD , and V: switching cost to Y , YK . The base case solution is given as a 
benchmark.   
Table 6: 
Joint Formulation 
Impact of Variations in the Variables on the Lower and Upper Thresholds 
and Corresponding Option Coefficients 
 
 
ˆDDXv   ˆSSXv   2 XA   1XA   
Base case 766.78 1588.07 5.84420E+05 1.13156E-04 
I 1680Xf =   789.49 1506.45 6.28476E+05 1.77259E-04 
 1520Xf =   740.79 1707.93 5.40591E+05 5.33886E-05 
II 315Yf =   773.09 1655.23 5.85841E+05 8.83042E-05 
 285Yf =   760.02 1525.51 5.82877E+05 1.40779E-04 
III 2625XD = −   764.87 1595.75 5.80987E+05 1.08310E-04 
25 
 
 2375XD = −   768.67 1580.60 5.87855E+05 1.18027E-04 
IV 126YD = −   766.84 1588.84 5.84433E+05 1.12928E-04 
 114YD = −   766.72 1587.29 5.84407E+05 1.13383E-04 
V 6300YK =   775.63 1696.99 5.86408E+05 7.85368E-05 
 5700YK =   756.87 1489.70 5.82152E+05 1.53984E-04 
 
The thresholds specifying the inaction region, ( )ˆ ˆ,DDX SSXv v , are evaluated from (21) using the base case values and the 
policy (a) and (b) option coefficients, 2 1,X XA A , from (19) or (20). The impacts are evaluated for a 5% increase and 
decrease in the base case value for I: operating charge under X , Xf , II operating charge under Y , Yf , III: divestment 
value for X , XD , IV: divestment value for Y , YD , and V: switching cost to Y , YK . The base case solution is given 
as a benchmark. 
A comparison of the two formulations reveals that for revenue levels close to the divestment 
thresholds, a Xf  increase due to government requirements (or removing subsidies) or 
unanticipated maintenance may be sufficient to trigger divestment under the Dixit model, but 
not necessarily under the Décamps model. In contrast, a Xf  decrease due to government 
subsidies or tax reliefs or cost sharing across contiguous fields has the opposite effect and 
defers divestment. The impact of lower decommissioning costs arising from tax credits or 
subsidies makes divestment only slightly more likely. A lower investment switching cost due 
to a tax credit or subsidy makes switching more attractive and divestment less attractive. 
3.3 Variations in Volatility 
A volatility increase for a standard investment-style model causes a threshold increase 
thereby deferring exercise and enhancing the option value, Dixit and Pindyck (1994). For a 
divestment-switching joint formuation, a volatility increase also causes a switching threshold 
increase, which results in an earlier exercise, but it is accompanied by a reduced option value 
because continuance has lost attractiveness. The impact of volatility variations 0.5σ ≤  on 
separately formulated derived solutions for policy (a) and (b) are presented in Figure 3, 
illustrating their thresholds, and Figure 4, illustrating the ratio of their option coefficients, 
evaluated using the base case values except for the variations in volatility. These figures 
show policy (b) is preferred provided 0.38σ ≤ . If  0.39σ ≥ , then policy (a) is preferred 
because of its greater option coefficient despite having a lower threshold. In view of this, we 
confine our investigation of the effect of volatility changes on the inaction region to the range 
0.38σ ≤ . 





For the various price volatilities, the thresholds for policy (a) ˆDXv  (divest) and policy (b) ˆSXv  (switch) are determined 
from (9) and (15), respectively.  Some illustrated threshold values are shown below. 
σ   ˆDXv   ˆSXv   
0.005 1474.39 4373.17 
0.05 1419.36 4209.70 
0.10 1295.49 3839.68 
0.15 1156.23 3420.74 
0.20 1023.32 3020.06 
0.25 903.32 2659.37 
0.30 797.48 2342.93 
0.35 705.12 2068.46 
0.40 624.95 1831.48 
0.45 555.51 1627.11 
0.50 495.37 1450.71 
 




For the various price volatilities, the option coefficient for policy (a) 2DXA  and (b) 2SXA  are determined from (10) and (16), 
respectively. Some illustrated option coefficient values are shown below. 
σ   2DXA   2SXA   2 2SX DXA A   
0.005 2.0860E+09 7.5620E+09 3.6251 
0.05 6.7082E+08 2.0529E+09 3.0603 
0.10 8.1632E+07 1.8232E+08 2.2335 
0.15 1.3168E+07 2.2460E+07 1.7056 
0.20 3.3674E+06 4.7240E+06 1.4029 
0.25 1.2396E+06 1.5164E+06 1.2234 
0.30 5.9116E+05 6.5670E+05 1.1109 
0.35 3.3828E+05 3.5065E+05 1.0366 
0.36 3.0771E+05 3.1534E+05 1.0248 
0.37 2.8125E+05 2.8515E+05 1.0139 
0.38 2.5824E+05 2.5918E+05 1.0037 
0.39 2.3811E+05 2.3672E+05 0.9942 
0.40 2.2042E+05 2.1717E+05 0.9853 
0.41 2.0482E+05 2.0009E+05 0.9769 
0.42 1.9099E+05 1.8509E+05 0.9691 
0.43 1.7868E+05 1.7186E+05 0.9618 
0.44 1.6769E+05 1.6013E+05 0.9549 
0.45 1.5784E+05 1.4970E+05 0.9485 
0.50 1.2118E+05 1.1164E+05 0.9212 
When ˆX SXv v< , the stopping regions for policy (a) and (b) are obtained from the joint 
formulation. Figures 5 and 6 illustrate, respectively, the thresholds and option coefficients for 
the volatility variations 0.18 0.38σ≤ ≤ . Figure 5 reveals that the Décamps et al. (2006) 
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conditions hold for the exhibited volatilities. The thresholds ˆ ˆ ˆ, ,SX DX DDXv v v  are decreasing 
while ˆSSXv  is an increasing function of volatility, implying that volatility increases produce a 
narrowing of the policy (b) stopping region to zero but a widening of  the inaction region 
until ˆ ˆDDX DXv v=  and ˆ ˆSSX SXv v=  at 0.38σ = . Further, at 0.38σ = , the separately formulated 
option values for policy (a) and (b) and the jointly formulated option value for policy (a) are 
all equal. When coefficients are equal, shown in Figure 6 at .38σ = , the owner is indifferent 
between the two policies but selects policy (b) if  ˆX SXv v= ˆSSXv= , policy (a) if 
ˆ ˆX DX DDXv v v≤ = , and waits if otherwise. On the other hand, if 0.38σ > , the option coefficient 
1 0XA <  making the solution implausible and ˆ ˆSSX SXv v> making the solution infeasible, 
violating the Décamps et al. (2006) conditions. Since policy (a) has greater option value 
despite a lower threshold, policy (a) is treated as the preferred alternative for 0.38σ > .  
There is no numerical solution4 to (21) for low volatility such as 0.18σ < , which is reflected 
in the terminated range for Figures 5 and 6. This is probably because of errors being 
introduced by multiplying a very small number like 1XA  with very large number like 
1 1ˆ ˆ,X XSSX DDXv v
β β , rather than due to implausibility or infeasibility. Despite the computational 
difficulties, we can make inferences as the volatility declines to zero. Decreases in volatility 
produce a widening of the policy (b) stopping region but a narrowing of the inaction region 
until the inaction region disappears for 0σ =  owing to the absence of uncertainty. At this 
point,  ˆ ˆDDX SSXv v= . By making this substitution in  (18), then it follows that 
ˆ ˆ 1200DDX SSXv v= = , which implies that for ˆX SXv v< , the stopping regions for policy (a) and 
(b) are ( ) ( )ˆ ˆ ˆ, , ,0SX SSX SSXv v v , respectively, while the inaction region is a null set. In addition to 
these computational issues, Bobtcheff and Villeneuve (2010)  note that the suitability of the 
joint formulation perhaps rests on whether the policy alternatives yield similar net values.   
Figure 5: Optimal Thresholds for Price Volatility Variations 
                                               
4 The calculations are computed using Mathematica© Version 11.3. Errors are obtained when the numerical 
solutions to (21) are substituted into the value-matching relationship (18) and the associated smooth-pasting 
conditions. As an illustration, for 0.17σ = , the errors following the substitution for the respective value-
matching relationships are 11 118.01 10 , 3.84 10− −− × − ×  and for the smooth-pasting conditions 4.16, 13.44− − . 
Also 101 8.58 10XA
−= × . The errors in calculation are interpreted as being due to the presence of very very small 
numbers in computing some of the expressions rather than to a mathematical singularity.  We have also repeated 
these calculations using other numerical methods, which show that the A1X option coefficients become tiny with 
low volatility and negative with high volatility, violating the Décamps et al. (2006) conditions with these other 




For the various price volatilities, the threshold policy (a) ˆDXv  is found from (9), for (b) ˆSXv   from (15), the thresholds 
specifying the inaction region, joint lower, joint upper ( )ˆ ˆ,DDX SSXv v   from (21), using the base case values except for σ . 
The invest in policy (b) stopping region is ( )ˆ ˆ,SSX SXv v , the invest in policy (a) stopping regions is  ( )ˆ0, DDXv , and the two 
waiting regions are  ( )ˆ, SXv∞  and  ( )ˆ ˆ,DDX SSXv v .  Some illustrated threshold values are shown below.  
σ   ˆDXv   ˆSXv   ˆDDXv   ˆSSXv   
0.18 1075.12 3176.17 965.77 1337.59 
0.20 1023.32 3020.06 930.60 1368.48 
0.22 973.63 2870.52 896.02 1403.10 
0.24 926.19 2727.97 862.24 1441.83 
0.26 881.03 2592.56 829.39 1485.15 
0.28 838.14 2464.27 797.55 1533.66 
0.30 797.48 2342.93 766.78 1588.07 
0.32 758.98 2228.33 737.10 1649.26 
0.34 722.57 2120.20 708.51 1718.35 
0.36 688.16 2018.22 681.01 1796.74 
0.38 655.65 1922.09 654.59 1886.25 
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For a revenue level close to the divestment thresholds, a volatility increase makes divestment 
deferral less likely under the Dixit model, and somewhat less likely under the Décamps 
model. A volatility increase under the Décamps model produces a wider inaction region, and 
a greater hysteresis effect, but a narrower policy (b) stopping region. The attractiveness of 
policy (b) wanes as the volatility increases to the extent that policy (b) is no longer the 
preferred alternative for very large volatility levels. 
Figure 6: Option Coefficient Values for Price Volatility Variations 
 
For the various price volatilities, the option coefficient for policy (a) 2DXA  is found from (10), for (b) 2SXA  from (16), 
and for the modified formulation, 2 1,X XA A , from (19) or (20), using the base case values except for σ . Some illustrated 
option coefficient values are shown below. 
σ   2DXA   2SXA   2 XA   1XA   
0.18 5.5250E+06 8.3129E+06 5.3061E+06 5.4212E-09 
0.20 3.3674E+06 4.7240E+06 3.2533E+06 1.0253E-07 
0.22 2.1753E+06 2.8719E+06 2.1132E+06 9.3469E-07 
0.24 1.4784E+06 1.8518E+06 1.4435E+06 5.0859E-06 
0.26 1.0500E+06 1.2566E+06 1.0300E+06 1.8894E-05 
0.28 7.7489E+05 8.9119E+05 7.6323E+05 5.2218E-05 
0.30 5.9116E+05 6.5670E+05 5.8442E+05 1.1316E-04 
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0.32 4.6420E+05 5.0024E+05 4.6043E+05 1.9707E-04 
0.34 3.7381E+05 3.9221E+05 3.7185E+05 2.7263E-04 
0.36 3.0771E+05 3.1534E+05 3.0689E+05 2.6949E-04 
0.38 2.5824E+05 2.5918E+05 2.5813E+05 7.1635E-05 
     
 
3.4 Variations in the Rate Parameters 
The impact of variations in , , ,X Yr δ q q  on the solution results obtained from the separate and 
joint formulations are illustrated in Appendix C. Generally, lower interest rates would 
motivate earlier divestment under both methods, and encourage adoption of the lower cost 
technology mostly under the Dixit method. 
3.5 Partly Deferred Divestment 
Because of the time value of money, policy (b) can be expected to enjoy a performance 
improvement whenever the divestment of X  is partly deferred to coincide with the 
divestment of Y . The proportion of X  that is divested at the exercise of policy (b) is 
denoted by ϕ , so the magnitude of the divestment deferral is related to 1 ϕ− . For ˆX SXv v>  
and policy (b) having the greater option coefficient, Table 7 illustrates the effect of ϕ  
variations, 1.0,0.8, ,0.0ϕ =  , on the thresholds and option coefficients pertaining to policy 
(b). Clearly, policy (a) remains unaffected. This reveals that as ϕ  decreases, both the Y  
divestment threshold ˆDYv  and the divestment option coefficient 2DYA  decline. This suggests 
that X  divestment deferral postpones the timing of the subsequent Y  divestment thereby 
prolonging the economic extraction of oil and reduces the value of the Y  divestment option. 
In contrast, a ϕ  reduction raises both the policy (b) threshold ˆSYv  and the switch option 
coefficient 2KYA . An increase in the amount of X  divestment that can be deferred makes not 
only the opportunity to switch to policy (b) more valuable but also advances the timing for 
switching optimally. This suggests that X  divestment deferral is beneficial for the various 
parties associated with extracting oil from depleted fields. The owner benefits from the 
increase in the residual oil reserve value while the suppliers of technology Y  are favoured by 
earlier sales for their innovation. The government is also a beneficiary because of tax 




Table 7: The Effect Obtained Separately of ϕ  Variations on Policy (b)  
ϕ   ˆDYv   2DYA   ˆSXv   2SXA   
1.0 133.30 71405.1 2342.93 656696.6 
0.8 121.97 61900.6 2413.85 677028.9 
0.6 110.63 52918.2 2484.50 698111.2 
0.4 99.30 44478.3 2554.87 719947.2 
0.2 87.96 36604.6 2624.98 742542.5 
0.0 76.63 29324.7 2694.83 765906.1 
 
The thresholds and option coefficients, 2 2ˆ ˆ, , ,DY SX DY SXv v A A  are obtained from (22) and (23) using the base case values.    
 
Similar kinds of results are obtained for the joint formulation when ˆX SXv v<  and policy (b) 
having the greater option coefficient, except that policy (a) is now affected. Table 8 illustrates 
the effect of ϕ  variations on the thresholds and option coefficients for both policy (a) and 
(b). As expected, a ϕ  decline produces a rise in the policy (b) option coefficient ( )1XA ϕ  but a 
fall in the policy (a) option coefficient ( )2 XA ϕ , because X  divestment deferral makes policy 
(b) relatively more attractive despite the X  divestment value for policy (a) remaining 
unaffected. Further, a ϕ  decline produces falls in both the lower and upper thresholds, 
ˆ ˆ,DDX SSXv v , respectively. This results in the expansion of the policy (b) stopping region 
( )ˆ ˆ,SSX SXv v  but the shrinkage of both the inaction region ( )ˆ ˆ,DDX SSXv v  and the policy (a) 
stopping region ( )ˆ0, DDXv . Again, this signifies that X  divestment deferral favours policy 
(b). 
 
Table 8: The Effect Obtained Jointly of ϕ  Variations on Policies (a) and (b) 
ϕ   ˆDDXv   ˆSSXv   2 XA   1XA   
1.0 766.78 1588.07 584420.2 1.1316E-04 
0.8 755.25 1485.99 581777.1 1.6087E-04 
0.6 742.43 1393.59 578763.1 2.1770E-04 
0.4 728.27 1308.65 575342.4 2.8543E-04 
0.2 712.72 1229.55 571472.5 3.6638E-04 
0.0 695.72 1155.04 567102.0 4.6359E-04 
 
The thresholds and option coefficients 2 1ˆ ˆ, , ,DDX SSX X Xv v A A  are obtained from (25) and (26). 
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For policy (a), XD remains the same for any ϕ , since deferred divestment is only applicable 
for policy (b), not policy (a). A government measure enabling  divestment to be partly 
deferred  would entail a reduced ϕ   and a lower XD  but only for policy (b). This results in 
making policy (b) relatively more attractive because of the reduced switching investment 
cost, which is reflected in a wider policy (b) stopping region, but a narrower policy (a) 
stopping region and a narrower inaction region.  [Note that reducing the initial divestment 
cost defers, but does not eliminate, the decommissioning costs, so the results are not 
comparable with Table 6.] 
4 Conclusion and Discussion 
We formulate a real option model for determining the optimal rescale decision to switch from 
conventional to appropriate technology for a marginal mature off-shore oil installation. As an 
active field becomes increasingly marginalised, the original technologies are not economic 
and without a rescaling-contraction the residual oil in the reserve becomes economically 
trapped and inaccessible. Our model is formulated on oil price uncertainty described by a 
geometric Brownian motion process and a dynamic declining output volume, assumptions 
which enable a tractable analytical solution to be derived from the representation based on 
periodic revenue. The formulation incorporates divestment options not only because of the 
high cost in decommissioning an expended rig and its resulting impact on the divestment 
decision, but also because of its role in terminating an infinitely lived asset implied by the 
American perpetuity representation. However, the presence of abandonment affects whether a 
rescale can exist, since any feasible rescaling-contraction may have to be implemented while 
the oil reserve is active and not subsequent to divestment when the reserve is idle. Other 
assumptions made are typical for most other analytical real option models. 
 
We have viewed the sequential investment/disinvestment decisions for a marginal oil field in 
four distinct ways. Initially, the evaluation of policy (a) of divesting the original installation 
and of policy (b) of switching to a lower cost technology is based on separate formulations, 
assuming that the threshold for the more valuable alternative has not yet been attained. Then 
we evaluate the joint formulation for policy (a) and (b), assuming that the threshold for the 





We assume a UK government assumes North Sea investors believe some (or all) of the above 
equations, a heroic assumption. We further assume that achieving a fundamental government 
goal of maximizing the economic recovery of oil from marginal fields is motivated by the 
early switching to a lower cost technology. Then, government should craft policies with the 
objective of stimulating a switch to policy (b) while at the same time deterring policy (a), the 
complete divestment of the incumbent technology. This entails measures designed to raise the 
policy (b) threshold ˆSXv  and extend its stopping region ˆ ˆ( , )SSX SXv v , while simultaneously 
having the effect of reducing the divestment threshold ˆDXv , shrinking the policy (a) stopping 
region ( )ˆ0, DDXv , but widening the inaction region ( )ˆ ˆ,DDX SSXv v . Our aim is to identify policy 
variables that affect these thresholds in the appropriate direction. Possibly 
, , , , , ,X X Y X Y Y pv f f D D K σ can be altered some through government actions such as price 
guarantees, subsidies or tax reliefs, which could promote MER.  
 
Q1 Does the stochastic element, price volatility, matter? 
 
Although oil price volatility is not directly controllable, governments can introduce structured 
price guarantees such as feed-in-tariffs or collars that are potentially capable of moderating 
the cash-flow volatility. Any volatility reduction has positive consequences for both policy 
(a) and (b) due to the increase in their thresholds ˆ ˆ,SX DXv v . But, our illustration reveals that the 
effect on policy (b) is greater together with some evidence supporting an enlargement of the 
policy (b) stopping region.  
 
Q2 Does the analytical method matter? 
 
It is obvious that not only does the possibility of an alternative lower cost technology reduce 
the incentives for decommissioning in most cases, but considering the joint formation results 
in a significant reduction in the decommissioning threshold. However, depending on the 
current gross revenue, possible hysteresis is justified under the joint (and not the separate) 
formulation, which would not encourage adoption of lower cost technology, but could lead to 
MER.  There are problems obtaining a feasible solution in the joint formation at very high 





Q3 Does allowing for partial divestment defer decommissioning, or hasten the adoption of 
lower cost technologies, both promoting MER? 
 
Switches to policy (b) become more attractive if government enacts concessions that permit 
decommissioning of technology X  to be partly deferred or favour switching technologies 
initiatives utilizing a high proportion of the assets underpinning technology X . Partial 
decommissioning with its lower ϕ  makes policy (b) more attractive by raising its switching 
threshold ˆSXv  but policy (a) less attractive by lowering its switching threshold ˆDXv . It also 
significantly widens the policy (b) stopping region ( )ˆ ˆ,SSX SXv v .  
 
Q4 Are changes in other plausible government policies likely to lead to MER? 
 
The other policy variables are selected from Table 2. The significance of altering these policy 
variables is drawn from the tables and figures presented in Section 3. We do not consider the 
impact of changing items such as , ,X Yδ q q , since they are not subject to governmental 
influence (δ  is derived from the term structure of crude oil futures prices, and ,X Yq q  are 
surely technical matters).  Alternative royalty structures, subsidizing prices and expenses 
could moderate , ,X X Yv f f , although a more customary approach is to reduce corporate 
income taxes, which we have not explicitly considered. A subsidy may take the form of a 
preferential loan that lowers the interest rate. A reduced interest rate has the effect of 
increasing all the relevant thresholds for both policy (a) and (b), together with an enlarged 
policy (b) stopping region, but our illustration reveals the effect on policy (b) to be 
significantly greater.  
 
A subsidy designed to lower Xf  would reduce both ˆ ˆ,SX DXv v , and result in prolonging the life 
of the incumbent technology but not necessarily in maximizing oil recovery. It may also 
inhibit innovation. A more favourable royalty structure would have a similar effect of 
deterring both switching to policy (b) and divestment. In contrast, a subsidy designed to 




A more attractive decommissioning allowance and investment subsidy each tend to favour 
technology Y , but in distinct ways. Although modest, an improved decommissioning 
allowance for technology Y  produces an enlarged policy (b) stopping region but a reduced 
policy (a) stopping region, but it has no effect on the switching threshold ˆSXv . In contrast, a 
decommissioning allowance for technology X  leads to an increased ˆSXv and expanded 
stopping regions for policy (a) and (b). In reality, any revision in decommissioning 
allowances would have to be applied equally to either technology, so the overall impact is 
likely to be somewhat positive for policy (b) while neutral for policy (a). A more plausible 
driver for motivating a switch to policy (b) is an investment subsidy. This has the effect of 
increasing the switching threshold ˆSXv  and expanding the stopping region for policy (b), 
while narrowing that for policy (a). 
 
In summary, a government has at its disposal a range of plausible policies capable of 
stimulating investors to switch from the incumbent oil extraction technology to one that is 
more appropriate. The illustrations demonstrate the successes or otherwise of the measures on 
offer are not identical but vary, often by a significant magnitude. There is no recommended 
preferred measure since it depends on the context, and each has to be assessed on its 
particular merits.  
 
Our focus is on evaluating the effect of changes in government policy that engender more 
favourable thresholds and on earlier investment in the lower cost technology leading to MER.  
Maximizing the option values have not been cited as the primary objective for the 
government. However, if petroleum investors recognize the modelled real option values (and 
are willing and able to pay the government for these concession option values) the incentives 
that a government could offer for increasing such option values is another story.  Finally, 
some of these policy instruments are relevant only over certain ranges, and our conclusions 
are based on +/- 5% from the base case except for ,pσ ϕ . Some sensitivity analysis for larger 
deviations from the base case show no changes in the sign of the affect, but the sensitivity 
magnitudes change. 
 
The analysis can be extended in several ways. The model in its presented form investigates 
the comparative merits of a rescaling-contraction assuming known rescaling properties and 
the absence of contending alternatives.   Many of the parameter values such as operating 
37 
 
costs, rescaling and decommissioning costs are considered constant (although shown over 
some ranges in the tables and figures), which is not necessarily realistic.  The increasing 
global prevalence of marginal fields may result in innovation with the possibility of the 
arrival of a more sophisticated appropriate technology with properties outperforming those 
studied here. This raises the question of whether the extractor should enact the rescale 
decision promptly or wait until the innovation emerges. Also, the analysis is performed in 
isolation of economic alternatives such as gaining improvements through production and cost 
efficiency gains. These developments should lead to a richer and more insightful 
representation of the economics of marginal fields. 
 
Possible other applications of this model are rescaling shopping centres suffering from online 
retail to lower cost alternative uses, bookshops to dining and conceivably accommodation 
uses, licensed taxi systems to lower cost transportation arrangements, hotel booking systems 
to private accommodation sharing, and retraining mature workers (and educators) in a 
competitive context.  However, decommissioning (retirement) costs, rates and quality of 
output before/after rescaling, and transformation investments will not be the same as in oil 
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